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Abstract 
There has been some debate regarding the roles of moral cognitions and emotions in 
understanding moral development. We examined the short-term longitudinal relations among 
perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, prosocial behaviors and aggression in 
adolescents.  The final sample included of 489 students (M age = 12.28 years, SD = .48; 232 
boys and 257 girls) in public and private schools from predominantly middle class families in 
Valencia, Spain. Students completed measures of perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral 
reasoning, prosocial behaviors, and aggressive behaviors twice in a one year interval. In general, 
path analyses showed that social cognitions and emotions were interrelated and predicted both 
prosocial behaviors and aggression. Furthermore, residual change analyses revealed that 
developmental changes in social cognitions and sympathy were linked to developmental changes 
in prosocial and aggressive behaviors.  Discussion focuses on support for cognitive 
developmental theory and on implications for debate regarding the relevance of cognitions and 
emotions in moral development. 
 
KEYWORDS: prosocial behaviors, moral reasoning, perspective taking, sympathy, aggressive 
behaviors 
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For centuries, philosophers have debated the roles of emotions and cognitions in morality 
(Hume, 1751/1957; Kant, 1785/1993). More recently, among psychologists, such debates have 
resurfaced in the writings of major moral theorists such as Kohlberg (1984) and Hoffman (2000). 
Cognitive developmental theorists emphasized the role of moral cognitions in moral 
development and this perspective continues to heavily influence contemporary research (Turiel, 
1998; Lapsley, 1996). However, other theoretical perspectives have attempted to understand the 
interplay of moral emotions and cognitions (Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003; Staub, 2005) and 
some recent theories have suggested that moral emotions are primary to moral cognitions (Haidt, 
2001). Although this debate is likely to continue, research on examining the simultaneous 
influence of moral cognitions and moral emotions processes is needed. Furthermore, because 
moral developmental scholars are interested in change across time, longitudinal studies on these 
processes are needed to understand developmental changes in moral behaviors.  The present 
study was designed to examine the longitudinal relations and changes in perspective taking, 
sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, prosocial behaviors, and aggression in adolescence. 
Cognitive developmental scholars have identified two primary social cognitions that are 
conceptually and empirically associated with moral behaviors: prosocial moral reasoning and 
perspective taking. Prosocial moral reasoning is defined as decision making regarding helping 
opportunities when there is a conflict between another’s and one’s psychological or physical 
needs in situations where there are no laws or formal social guidelines. Unlike prohibition-
oriented moral reasoning that emphasizes issues of justice and life-and-death (see Kohlberg, 
1984), prosocial moral reasoning is an aspect of morality that entails issues of caring and 
interpersonal relationships (Eisenberg, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Pratt, Skoe, & Armold, 2004). 
Eisenberg (1986) outlined five levels of prosocial moral reasoning commonly observed among 
Feelings or Cognitions -- 4 
 
children and adolescents:  hedonistic, approval-oriented, needs-oriented, stereotyped, and 
internalized (including reasoning about empathy).  Eisenberg (1986) proposed that prosocial 
moral reasoning becomes progressively more complex as cognitive maturation and social 
experiences accumulate, including the development of perspective taking skills (i.e. 
understanding another’s thoughts, emotions, and social situations). Furthermore, prosocial moral 
reasoning is conceptually linked to moral emotions such as sympathy (i.e. feelings of sorrow or 
concern for others) such that moral reasoning (and perspective taking) can induce or prime 
sympathy and vice versa (Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991; Hoffman, 2000). Based on 
prior empirical work, Eisenberg and her colleagues have found that hedonistic, approval-
oriented, and needs-oriented prosocial moral reasoning types are frequently expressed by 
elementary school age whereas stereotyped and internalized emerge in middle school and high 
school ages (Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991; Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy & 
Van Court, 1995). Furthermore, several investigators have shown that prosocial moral reasoning 
is related positively to prosocial behaviors (i.e. actions intended to benefit others), sympathy, and 
perspective taking (Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 1992; Carlo, Hausmann, Christiansen, & 
Randall, 2003; Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001), and negatively related 
to aggression (Laible, Eye, & Carlo, 2008; Wyatt & Carlo, 2002).  
Another social cognition that is hypothesized to be related to moral behaviors is 
perspective taking.  Similar to prosocial moral reasoning, perspective taking is believed to 
become more sophisticated with age and continues to develop well into adolescence (Kurdek, 
1978; Selman, 1980). Batson (1998), Davis (1983), Hoffman (2000), and Eisenberg (1986) have 
all speculated that perspective taking is required for sympathy responding and ought to facilitate 
prosocial behaviors and mitigate aggression. According to these scholars, understanding how 
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others are feeling, their intentions and desires, and their social circumstances should lead to 
greater sympathy and prosocial behavioral responding for those who need assistance or who are 
suffering. Indeed, cognitive developmental scholars have noted that age-related changes in 
prosocial behaviors might be associated with age-related changes in perspective taking 
(Eisenberg, 1986; Underwood & Moore, 1982). However, direct empirical evidence on this 
notion is sparse (see Carlo, Knight, McGinley, Goodvin, & Roesch, in press).  Furthermore, prior 
researchers have found somewhat mixed relations between perspective taking and prosocial 
behaviors; though meta-analytic reviews have revealed that there is an overall modest positive 
association between these constructs (Carlo et al., in press; Underwood & Moore, 1982). Other 
studies have shown that aggression and externalizing behaviors are negatively associated with 
perspective taking (see Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). In addition, recent studies have shown that 
sympathy is positively associated with perspective taking (Eisenberg et al., 2001).  
As mentioned previously, there has been a great deal of interest in the role of emotions in 
morality, with a special focus on sympathy or compassion. Several scholars have noted the 
conceptual importance and relevance of sympathy in prosocial behaviors and in aggression. By 
definition, sympathy pulls individuals to emotionally respond to the plight and needs of others to 
reduce their suffering. Consequently, feelings of compassion are also believed to inhibit causing 
harm to others (Feshbach, 1987). Indeed, the lack of compassion for others is noted as a central 
component of clinical psychopathy and has been linked to delinquency (Hare, 2006). Batson 
(1998) asserts that sympathy (or the closely related notion of empathy, or feeling the same as 
another) is the basis for altruistic behaviors (i.e., selflessly motivated behaviors primarily 
intended to benefit others often under risky circumstances and without reward expectations). 
Similarly, Hoffman (2000) argues that sympathy frequently serves as the primary motive behind 
Feelings or Cognitions -- 6 
 
prosocial behaviors. Thus, although perspective taking enables the individual to understand the 
social situation and thereby foster sympathy, sympathy is the emotional component that moves 
the individual toward prosocial action and away from harming or injuring others. There is 
relatively substantial evidence on the significant associations between sympathy and both 
prosocial and aggressive behaviors (Batson, 1998; Carlo, 2006; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Miller 
& Eisenberg, 1988).  
Despite the available evidence on the links among perspective taking, prosocial moral 
reasoning, sympathy, prosocial and aggressive behaviors, several questions remain. First, most 
studies on the relations between prosocial and aggressive behaviors and these sociocognitive and 
socioemotive predictors are cross-sectional designs, which limit our ability to infer causality and 
to examine hypothesized developmental changes. Second, studies that examine whether changes 
in these sociocognitive and socioemotive traits account for changes in levels of moral behaviors 
are extremely rare. In one notable exception, investigators have reported that longitudinal 
changes in prosocial behaviors were accounted for by longitudinal changes in sympathy 
(Eisenberg et al., 1999). And third, few studies have had large enough samples to examine the 
multivariate relations between perspective taking, prosocial moral reasoning, and sympathy, and 
these social behaviors.  In a cross-sectional study, Eisenberg et al. (2001) reported that 
perspective taking was related positively to sympathy and prosocial moral reasoning, sympathy 
was related positively to prosocial moral reasoning and prosocial behaviors, and prosocial moral 
reasoning was associated positively to prosocial behaviors (in a sample of Brazilian adolescents). 
The present study was designed to further examine these multivariate relations in a longitudinal 
sample of adolescents from Spain.  
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To examine the relations among social cognitions, emotions, and behaviors, data was collected 
from adolescents in Spain. Although it is difficult to adequately characterize people from 
countries because of within group heterogeneity, researchers have often done so to 
contextualize their findings. Spain is similar to most other Western, industrialized societies 
and is a member of the European Union.  There is much diversity in Spain because of its 
long history of Roman, Moorish, and Christian traditions and because of recent 
immigration trends. The primary language in Spain is Spanish though there are 3 other 
major languages and various dialects. However, like many other Hispanic cultures, Spain is 
generally characterized as a society that values the family (Elzo, 2004; Samper, 1999). 
Recent surveys reveal that the family and health are rated higher than work, friends, and 
religion (CIS, 2004). Although religion is not rated as highly as family and health, religion 
(primarily Christianity) continues to play a major role in the culture and social customs of 
Spanish life (CIS, 2004). With regard to other social aspects and traditions, in general, 
Spain ranks higher on individualism, and somewhat lower in masculinity, than other Latino 
cultures (Hofstede, 1984, 2001). However, Spain is substantially lower on individualism 
than the USA (Hofstede, 1984). Therefore, Spain is considered a moderately collectivist, 
feminine-oriented society (Basabe et al., 2000; Fernández-Berrocal, Salovey, Vera, Ramos 
& Extremera, 2001; Páez & Vergara, 1995).  Despite these generalizations regarding 
Spanish culture, prior research on perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, 
prosocial and aggressive behaviours in Spain show similar developmental patterns to those 
in studies conducted in the United States (Mestre, Samper & Frías, 2002; Mestre, Samper 
& Frías, 2004; Mestre, Samper, Nácher, Tur & Cortés, 2006; Mestre, Samper, Tur, Cortés 
& Nácher, 2006; Mestre, Tur, Samper, Nácher & Cortés, 2007).  
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In summary, based on prior theory and research, significant positive relations were 
expected among perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, and prosocial 
behaviors. In contrast, aggression was expected to be negatively related to perspective taking, 
sympathy, and prosocial moral reasoning. Furthermore, we expected that changes in perspective 
taking, sympathy, and prosocial moral reasoning would be associated with changes in prosocial 
and aggressive behaviors. Finally, based on prior empirical findings and theory (Gilligan, 1982; 
Eisenberg, 1986), adolescent girls were expected to report more perspective taking, sympathy, 
prosocial moral reasoning, and prosocial behaviors than adolescent boys, but less aggression than 
adolescent boys. 
Method 
Five hundred and five adolescents were recruited to participate in a longitudinal study 
examining positive and negative social behaviors.  Participants completed measures of 
perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, prosocial behaviors, and aggression 
(described below) at two separate time points.  Sixteen adolescents failed to complete both 
waves completely and thus were excluded from all analyses.  The final sample included of 489 
adolescents with an average age of 12.28 years (SD = .48).  The sample was composed of 232 
(47%) boys and 257 (53%) girls.  One hundred and forty eight (30%) were from public schools 
and 341 (70%) were from private schools.  SES was calculated using the Hollingshead 
classification scheme (adapted for use in Spain; Ibáñez, 2005).  The scale ranges from 1 to 7 (1 = 
top level administrative and business executives; 3 = mid-level administrators including 
administrative secretaries, insurance agents; 5 = skilled manual laborers such as auto mechanics, 
carpenters; 7 = unskilled workers such as cleaning workers, porters).  The mean SES of the 
sample was 3.25 (SD = 1.20).   
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Measures  
Each of the measures were previously translated into Spanish by a moral developmental 
researcher from Spain who is fluent in Spanish and back translated by a fellow, bilingual 
researcher.   
Sympathy was assessed with the sympathy subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI; Davis, 1980).  Participants responded to 7 items, such as “The problems of the others worry 
me” on a 5-point scale, anchored by 1 (does not describe you well) and 5 (describe you very 
well).  This scale showed acceptable internal consistency across at both waves (αs = .63 & .61, 
for waves 1 and 2, respectively); thus, composite scores were created by averaging across the 
items.   
Perspective taking was assessed with the perspective taking subscale of the IRI.  
Participants responded to 7 items, such as “When I must decide, I listen to different opinions” on 
a 5-point scale, anchored by 1 (does not describe you well) and 5 (describe you very well).  This 
scale showed to be reliable at both waves (αs = .62 & .64, waves 1 and 2, respectively); thus, 
composite scores were created by averaging across the items.   
Prosocial moral reasoning was assessed with the Prosocial Reasoning Objective 
Measure (PROM; Carlo, Eisenberg, & Knight, 1992).  The PROM contains stories designed to 
invoke a conflict between the actor's needs, wants, and desires and those of another (or others). 
The stories depict situations in which (a) helping a peer who is being teased versus incurring 
rejection from peers, (b) donate blood to a needy other at the cost of losing money at work and 
school, (c) go to the beach with friends or help a peer study to pass a math exam, (d) go to a 
party with friends or miss the party to help an injured boy, and (e) take food to the people of his 
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or her flooded village at the cost of not having sufficient food for him or herself.  For illustration, 
the teasing story is as follows:  
Sandy (Begoña) was a student at school.  One day Sandy was walking into her new class early 
and saw an older girl teasing and making fun of another girl's clothes.  The girl was crying.  
There was no one else around and Sandy did not know the girls very well, but she had heard that 
the girl that was being teased was very poor and the older girl had a lot of friends.  Sandy 
thought that maybe she should try to stop the older girl but she was afraid that the older girl and 
her friends might pick on her and tease her also.   
For each story, adolescents indicated whether the protagonist in the story should or 
should not help and then indicated the importance of five different reasons for making this 
decision.  The reasons reflect Eisenberg’s (1986) empirically supported theoretical perspective, 
which suggests that prosocial moral reasoning undergoes a developmental progression from 
childhood through adolescence.  Thus, in the order of progression from less to more mature 
forms of moral reasoning, each story included reasons reflecting hedonistic moral reasoning 
(e.g., “it depends whether Sandy can find other friends to do things with in school”), needs-
oriented moral reasoning (e.g., “it depends whether the other girl is crying a lot”), approval-
oriented moral reasoning (e.g., “it depends whether Sandy's classmates would approve of what 
she does”), stereotypic moral reasoning (e.g., “it depends whether Sandy thinks the older girl is 
mean or not”), and internalized moral reasoning (e.g., “it depends whether Sandy thinks that she 
is doing what she believes she should do”).  Adolescents rated each reason on a 5-point scale, 
anchored by 1 (not at all) and 5 (greatly).   
Scale scores were calculated through four-stage process (as described in prior research, 
e.g., Carlo et al., 1992).  First, scale scores for each type of prosocial moral reasoning were 
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derived by averaging across each type of item from the three stories.  Second, because all 
adolescents are expected to engage in each type of moral reasoning but show greater 
preference for some over others, proportion scores were computed by dividing each scale score 
by the sum total of responses to all five scale scores.  Third, because the five types of prosocial 
moral reasoning reflect varying levels of development, weights were applied to the proportion 
scores; hedonistic and needs oriented were weighted by 1, approval-oriented and stereotypic 
were weighted by 2, and internalized was weighted by 3.  Finally, composite prosocial moral 
reasoning scores were computed by summing across the weighted proportion scores.  This 
composite score (15 item scale) has a theoretical range from 1.43 (total preference for 
hedonistic moral reasoning) to 5.31 (total preference for internalized moral reasoning).  The 
actual range for the current sample was 1.53-2.08 for wave 1 and 1.60-2.19 for wave 2, which 
reflects the expectation that adolescents show varying degrees of preference for each type of 
prosocial moral reasoning.  The final composite scores showed acceptable internal consistency 
for both waves (αs = .73 & .76, waves 1 and 2, respectively).  The PROM has demonstrated 
acceptable reliability, construct, convergent, and discriminant validity in other studies with 
adolescents, including research with adolescents from Spain (Carlo, Koller, Eisenberg, Da 
Silva, & Frohlich, 1996; Carlo, McGinley, Roesch, & Wyatt, in press; Eisenberg, Carlo 
Murphy, & Van Court, 1995; Mestre, Frias, Samper, & Tur, 2002).  
Aggression was assessed with the Physical and Verbal Aggression Scale (Caprara & 
Pastorelli, 1993; Del Barrio, Moreno & López, 2001).  Participants responded to 20 items, such 
as “I kick or punch” on a 3-point scale, anchored by 1 never), 2 (sometimes), and 3 (always).  
This scale showed acceptable reliability (αs = .80 & .82, waves 1 and 2, respectively) and 
composite scores were computed by averaging across the items.   
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Prosocial behavior was assessed with the 10-item prosocial subscale of the Prosocial 
Behavior Scale (Caprara & Pastorelli, 1993; Del Barrio, Moreno, & Lopez., 2001).  Participants 
indicated the degree to which they engage in different types of prosocial behaviors, such as “I 
help my classmates do their homework,” on a 3-point scale, using the response options of 1 
(never), 2 (sometimes), and 3 (always).  This measure showed adequate reliability at both waves 
(αs = .75 & .76, waves 1 and 2, respectively); thus, scores were computed by averaging across 
the items.   
Procedure 
The schools that participated were randomly selected from the total schools centers in 
Valencia, Spain that had students enrolled in the first level of Secondary Obligatory Education 
(SEO).  A total of 22 schools (67 classrooms) participated.  Institutional Review Board approval 
from the School Council and informed parental consent were obtained before participating in the 
study and participation by students was voluntary.  The measures, including others not described 
here, were completed by groups of students in two 45-minute sessions in their classrooms during 
school hours.  Students participated in two successive annual evaluations (assessments occurred 
during the first quarter of the school course). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses and descriptive statistics  
Means, standard deviations, and repeated measure analysis of variances (ANOVAs) 
testing mean differences at each wave for each variable are reported in Table 1.  Overall, the 
sample showed moderate levels of perspective taking and sympathy, high levels of prosocial 
behavior, and somewhat low levels of prosocial moral reasoning and aggression.  ANOVAs 
showed that there was an increase between wave 1 and wave 2 in sympathy and a slight decrease 
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in prosocial moral reasoning.  There were no other significant differences across the two waves.   
Mean differences between boys and girls for each variable at each wave were examined 
using one-way ANOVAS.  As shown in Table 2, across both waves, girls were higher than boys 
in perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning and prosocial behavior but lower in 
aggression.  Zero-order correlations among the variables within each wave are reported in Table 
3.  As shown in the table, the correlations were consistent across the two waves.  Perspective 
taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, and prosocial behavior were all positively 
associated with each other and negatively associated with aggression.  SES, as reported at wave 
1, was negatively associated with prosocial moral reasoning at both waves but not significantly 
associated with any of the other variables.   
Analytic strategy  
Two longitudinal path models, using observed variable scores, were tested using 
maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (base models).  The first model 
included a path from wave 1 perspective taking to wave 1 sympathy, from these two variables to 
wave 1 prosocial moral reasoning, and from these three variables to prosocial behavior and 
aggression (longitudinal path model).  The second model was a cross-lagged path model in 
which the same model was tested using all the variables at wave 2 but controlling for all 
variables at wave 1 (cross-lagged path model).  For this model, the association between any two 
variables indicates the degree to which change in one variable from wave 1 to wave 2 is 
associated change in a second variable from wave 1 to wave 2, above and beyond any change 
that is due to initial levels of the respective variables.  Models were determined to fit the data 
well if they produced values of CFI > .95, RMSEA < .06, and SRMR < .08 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999).   
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Gender was next examined a moderator of the models using multiple group path analyses 
(moderation models).  For each model, a fully unconstrained model, in which each model 
parameter was allowed to vary across the groups, was compared to a model in which the path 
coefficients were constrained to be equal across groups.  The Satorra-Bentler (S-B; Satorra & 
Bentler, 1994) Δχ2 test was used to compare the fit of the constrained models relative to the 
unconstrained models.   
Tests of Base Models 
Longitudinal path model.  To examine the longitudinal relations between social 
cognitions and emotions and the social behaviors, a structural equation model analysis was 
conducted. The longitudinal path model is fully saturated; thus, fit indices were not available.  
Standardized path coefficients are shown in Figure 1.  As expected, perspective taking (wave 1) 
was positively related to sympathy (wave 1), prosocial behaviors (wave 2), and (marginally) to 
prosocial moral reasoning (wave1) but negatively related to aggression (wave 2). Sympathy 
(wave 1) was positively associated to prosocial moral reasoning (wave 1), prosocial behaviors 
(wave 2), and negatively related to aggression (wave 2). Prosocial moral reasoning (wave 1) was 
positively related to prosocial behaviors (wave 2) and negatively (marginally) related to 
aggression (wave 2). 
Cross-lagged path model.  To examine whether changes in predictor variables were 
associated with changes in outcomes, a cross-lagged path model analysis was conducted. The 
cross-lagged path model fit the data well [S-B χ2(20) = 53.23, p < .01, Correction Factor (CF) = 
1.20, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05].  Standardized path coefficients are shown in 
Figure 2.  As can be seen in the figure, changes in perspective taking were positively associated 
with changes in sympathy, prosocial behaviors, and prosocial moral reasoning (marginally), and 
Feelings or Cognitions -- 15 
 
negatively associated with changes in aggression.  Changes in sympathy were positively related 
to changes in prosocial moral reasoning and prosocial behaviors, but not associated with changes 
in aggression. Changes in prosocial moral reasoning were linked negatively with changes in 
aggression and positively linked (marginally) with changes in prosocial behaviors. It should also 
be noted that there were moderate one-year stability coefficients across the main study 
variables.1 
Tests of Moderation by Gender 
 To examine whether gender moderated the hypothesized relations, multigroup analyses 
were conducted. For the longitudinal path model, the model in which the path coefficients were 
constrained to be equal across boys and girls fit the data well [S-B χ2(9) = 4.63, p > .05, CF = 
1.02, CFI > .99, RMSEA = .03, SRMR < .01].  The χ2 value of this test also shows that it did not 
differ from the fully unconstrained model, which was fully saturated and thus had a χ2 value of 0. 
Thus, there was no moderation of gender in this model. For the cross-lagged path model, the 
fully unconstrained model fit the data well [S-B χ2(40) = 76.22, p < .01, CF = 1.15, CFI = .96, 
RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05] as did the model in which the path coefficients were constrained to 
be equal across boys and girls [S-B χ2(54) = 106.08, p < .01, CF = 1.15, CFI = .94, RMSEA = 
.06, SRMR = .06].  However, the constrained model showed a significant drop in fit relative to 
the unconstrained model [S-B Δχ2 (14) = 26.06, p < .05].  Thus, an additional model was tested 
in which the path from perspective taking to empathy was allowed to vary across boys and girls.  
This decision was based on the modification indices, which indicated that releasing this 
constraint would result in the largest increase in model fit.  The resulting model fit the data well 
[S-B χ2(53) = 100.54, p < .01, CF = 1.14, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06] and did not 
lead to a significant decrease in model fit relative to the fully unconstrained model [S-B Δχ2 (13) 
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= 21.68, p > .05].  Results showed that the association between perspective taking and empathy 
was stronger for boys (β = .43, p < .01) than for girls (β = .26, p < .01). 
Discussion 
 The overall pattern of findings regarding the longitudinal relations among perspective 
taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, prosocial and aggressive behaviors was as 
expected. Moral cognitions (perspective taking, prosocial moral reasoning) and moral emotions 
(sympathy) had predictive effects on prosocial and aggressive behaviors. Furthermore, 
perspective taking was related to both sympathy and prosocial moral reasoning, and sympathy 
was related positively to prosocial moral reasoning. Moreover, the residual path analyses 
revealed that changes in perspective taking and prosocial moral reasoning were associated with 
changes in aggressive and prosocial behaviors. Changes in sympathy were associated with 
changes in prosocial behaviors but not aggressive behaviors.  Although there were a few 
marginally significant relations, the general pattern of relations was as hypothesized even after 
statistically controlling for SES and when examining the predictive effects of social cognitions 
and emotions on behaviors one year later. The findings yielded evidence consistent with the 
notion that both moral cognitions and emotions are relevant processes necessary for 
understanding moral behaviors and development.  
 Although scholars have debated the relative importance of moral emotions and cognitions 
in understanding moral development, the present findings add to the accumulating evidence that 
both emotions and cognitions are important. Analyses confirmed prior theorizing that perspective 
taking and prosocial moral reasoning are sociocognitive traits that facilitate prosocial actions and 
mitigate aggressive behaviors. Furthermore, perspective taking was strongly associated with 
sympathy as several scholars have noted that perspective taking is an important dimension in 
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sympathy responding (Batson , 1998; Davis, 1983; Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 2000 ).  Although 
somewhat less strongly associated, there was also a marginally significant positive link between 
perspective taking and prosocial moral reasoning suggesting that understanding the social 
situation of others can foster higher moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984; Selman, 1980).  In 
addition, there were significant paths from sympathy to prosocial moral reasoning and to 
prosocial and aggressive behaviors as well. In general, the relations confirm prior research 
(mostly conducted in North American samples) that show that perspective taking, prosocial 
moral reasoning, and sympathy are all significant correlates of prosocial and aggressive 
behaviors (Carlo, 2006; Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; Coie & Dodge, 1998).  
Recent concerns regarding the importance of cognitions in moral functioning has often 
centered on the limitations of cognitive processing and methodological issues (see Haidt, 2001) 
but prior and present evidence shows that moral cognitions have somewhat stable qualities with 
enduring consequences. In addition, the present findings remind us that moral cognitions can 
play significant roles in predicting moral emotions and other important moral cognitions, and 
that emotions can also predict moral cognitions (Eisenberg, Shea et al., 1991; Hoffman, 2000).  
The fact that moral cognitions (and emotions) have enduring effects on social behaviors across 
time is probably due to the relative stability of these traits due to stable biological factors (e.g., 
temperament), psychological processes (e.g., sense of moral self), and socialization processes 
(e.g., relatively consistent family, peer, media experiences) (see Carlo, 2006; Eisenberg et al., 
2006). Recent work has begun to focus on the impact of moral identity on moral behaviors and 
there is evidence that moral cognitions are central factors in moral identity (Blasi, 2004; Hardy & 
Carlo, 2005; Hart, 2005; Narvaez, 2005). Thus, although it might be challenging to disentangle 
cognitive and emotional aspects of moral functioning due to methodological constraints, the 
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accumulated evidence to date points to likelihood that both processes are relevant and central 
aspects of moral functioning.  
Moreover, it is likely that moral cognitions and emotions might play somewhat different 
roles depending upon the specific form of moral behavior. Some forms of prosocial behaviors 
might require more thoughtful decision making (e.g., cost and benefit analyses) whereas other 
forms of helping might not (e.g., assisting someone in an unambiguous emergency situation).  
For example, when choosing to donate money to a charity organization, individuals likely 
consider the various advantages and disadvantages of different charity organizations. However, 
if someone observes a person in obvious distress that is physically injured, then cognitive 
processes such as moral reasoning might be less relevant or necessary than sympathy for 
prosocial responding. Analogously, in predicting different forms of aggressive behaviors, moral 
cognitions might be less relevant (e.g., impulsive, rage like aggression) or more relevant (e.g., 
purposeful, planned proactive aggression). Consistent with this notion, developmental scholars 
have found specific sociocognitive correlates of different types of prosocial behaviors and 
aggressive behaviors (Carlo et al. 2003; Carlo & Randall, 2002; Coie & Dodge, 1998; Crick & 
Dodge, 1996). Moreover, recent research using neuroimaging techniques supports the contention 
that the specific characteristics of moral tasks activate different regions of the brain associated 
with both emotions and cognitions (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2007; 
Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Branati, & Grafman, 2002). Therefore, the present findings and these 
various avenues of research suggest that future theoretical debates concerning the roles of 
emotions and cognitions would benefit from a focus on discerning the circumstances that engage 
cognitive and emotional moral processes. 
Although much theorizing exists on how social cognitions might account for 
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developmental changes in moral behaviors, few studies directly examine this notion. The present 
findings showed general support for the contention that changes in perspective taking, prosocial 
moral reasoning (marginally related to prosocial behaviors), and sympathy (was not related 
significantly to aggressive behaviors) accounted for changes in prosocial and aggressive 
behaviors.  The findings are in accord with cognitive developmental theorists who assert that the 
changes in perspective taking, sympathy, and prosocial moral reasoning skills accounts for 
changes in prosocial and aggressive behaviors.  The pattern of findings was relatively impressive 
given that change was examined over a relatively short period of time and during adolescence 
where one might expect development to be somewhat less dramatic than in earlier childhood. 
The effect of changes in perspective taking was particularly impressive given that it accounted 
for changes in both moral behaviors as well as in changes in sympathy and prosocial moral 
reasoning (marginally).  Moreover, in light of scholars’ assertions that perspective taking can be 
used to cause harm in others (Feshbach, 1987), the present findings suggest that such tendencies 
generally promote prosocialness and inhibit harm to others. Taken together, these findings are 
consistent with prior effective intervention efforts that focus on both moral cognitions and 
emotions to foster prosocial behaviors and to mitigate aggressive behaviors (Lewis, Watson, & 
Schaps, 2003; see Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). 
Tests of mean differences in gender and from wave 1 to wave 2 revealed some interesting 
results. Consistent with prior theorizing and research on gender differences (Maccoby & Jacklin, 
1974; Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987; Coie & Dodge, 1998), girls reported higher levels of 
perspective taking, sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, and prosocial behaviors, and lower 
levels of aggression than boys.  These findings suggest that girls and boys are subject to gender-
specific socialization experiences (e.g., gender specific parenting practices, different peer norms 
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and expectations) and/or biologically based processes (e.g., differential physical maturation 
rates) that result in distinct developmental trajectories of moral development (Brody, 1999; 
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).  Interestingly, analyses of variance tests revealed that there was a 
group mean increase in sympathy between wave 1 and wave 2 but prosocial moral reasoning 
decreased during that same period. Furthermore, there were no group mean differences in 
perspective taking, aggression, or prosocial behaviors from wave 1 to wave 2. Previous research 
with samples of European Americans from the US had yielded evidence of increases in 
sympathy, perspective taking, prosocial moral reasoning, and aggressive behaviors, and 
decreases in prosocial behaviors during middle adolescence (Carlo et al., 1992; Eisenberg et al., 
1995; Estrada, 1995). Given the fact that the present sample is from Spain and most prior studies 
examining age trends in these constructs are from samples in the US, further research will be 
needed to confirm these findings. Finally, it is worth noting that the results of the residual path 
analyses and the analyses of variance clearly showed that significant changes across time can 
occur though those changes might not be observed when examining group mean differences. 
Several methodological concerns limit our confidence in the present findings. First, all 
the measures used in the present study were self-report and therefore subject to self 
presentational biases. Although the measures are relatively established and commonly used 
instruments, one must always be cautious because participants might be susceptible to such 
biases. Second, the sample consists of adolescents from Spain and thus generalizations must be 
necessarily limited to adolescents with similar characteristics. Given that most prior research on 
moral development in adolescence has been conducted with samples from the US, comparability 
to those studies must be made cautiously. However, studies such as the present one are necessary 
to examine the universality of prosocial development models. And third, although longitudinal 
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studies improve our ability to make inferences regarding direction of causality, tests of 
alternative models including bidirectional models are desirable. It is likely that prosocial and 
aggressive actions result in feedback effects on adolescents’ perspective taking, sympathy and 
prosocial moral reasoning tendencies. Future research using multiple methods of assessment, 
adolescents from diverse samples, and examining alternative models of development are needed. 
Despite the limitations, the findings yielded additional evidence on the importance of 
both moral cognitions and emotions in predicting moral behaviors. Evidence showed that 
perspective taking, sympathy, and prosocial moral reasoning directly or indirectly facilitate 
prosocial behaviors and mitigate aggressive behaviors. Furthermore, the methodology allowed 
for examination of developmental change processes in a relatively large sample of adolescents 
and revealed that changes in social cognitions and emotions predicted changes in moral 
behaviors. The results further our understanding of moral development in Spanish adolescents 
and suggest that cognitive developmental models of moral development replicate in this different 
context. Clearly, much more research examining these models of moral development in other 
countries and societies are needed. However, thus far, the accumulated evidence from prior 
studies and the present study suggest that perspective taking, sympathy, and prosocial moral 
reasoning are theoretically important moral constructs relevant to understanding adolescents’ 
moral development.  
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Footnote 
1A separate set of model tests were conducted statistically controlling for SES to examine 
whether the pattern of findings were similar across SES levels. Results showed that the relations 
in both the longitudinal and residual model tests were interpretably the same. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics and repeated measures ANOVAS.   
F  Test
Mean SD Mean SD F (1, 488)
Perspective Taking 3.27 .64 3.32 .65 3.53
Sympathy 3.45 .65 3.56 .62 19.19**
Moral Reasoning 1.85 .07 1.84 .07 6.04*
Aggression 1.46 .28 1.45 .28 .06
Prosocial Behavior 2.55 .29 2.54 .29 .12
Wave 1 Wave 2
 
** p < .01. * p < .05.  
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Table 2. ANOVAS for waves 1 and 2 variables by sex.   
F  Test F  Test
Mean SD Mean SD F (1,487) Mean SD Mean SD F (1,487)
Perspective Taking 3.09 .60 3.43 .64 34.57** 3.15 .65 3.48 .62 31.80**
Sympathy 3.19 .64 3.68 .57 78.44** 3.32 .60 3.79 .54 82.83**
Moral Reasoning 1.83 .07 1.85 .07 12.95** 1.82 .07 1.85 .07 15.46**
Aggression 1.51 .27 1.41 .27 14.49** 1.52 .29 1.39 .25 28.49**
Prosocial Behavior 2.46 .30 2.62 .25 39.45** 2.44 .30 2.64 .24 68.38**
Boys Girls
Wave 1 Wave 2
Boys Girls
 
** p < .01. * p < .05.  
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Table 3. Correlations among the variables at waves 1 (below diagonal) and 2 (above diagonal).   
Perspective Moral Prosocial
Taking Sympathy Reasoning Aggression Behavior SES
Perspective Taking .51** .54** .23** -.32** .45** .03
Sympathy .52** .56** .30** -.28** .40** -.02
Moral Reasoning .24** .31** .54** -.22** .27** -.12**
Aggression -.36** -.28** -.26** .54** -.33** .02
Prosocial Behavior .52** .49** .25** -.32** .55** -.03
SES -.02 -.08 -.09* -.05 .03 -  
Note: Values on the diagonal are cross wave correlations.   
** p < .01. * p < .05. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  Longitudinal path model testing the associations between perspective taking (wave 1), 
sympathy (wave 1), prosocial moral reasoning (wave 1), aggression (wave 2) and prosocial 
behavior (wave 2).   
Figure 2.  Residual change path model testing the associations between perspective taking, 
sympathy, prosocial moral reasoning, aggression and prosocial behavior.   























** p < .01.  * p < .05.  †p < .10.  
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** p < .01.  * p < .05.  †p < .10.  
